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termed a "windfall to the insurer,"'" it is submitted that the court was
correct in refusing to extend the doctrine of subrogation to cover this
situation. D.D.
INSURANCE - TOTAL AND PERMANENT DISABILITY
IN LIFE INSURANCE
The insured had a policy of life insurance which provided for the
payment of disability benefits and waiver of premiums in the event he
"has become totally and permanently disabled and will for lifetime be
unable to perform any work or engage in any business for compensa-
tion or profit." He was afflicted with ulcers at the age of fifty-nine,
while employed as a roll-superintendent of a steel corporation. By reason
of the affliction he was confined to his bed for a number of months and
was only able to return as a watchman for three or four weeks and was
forced to discontinue this because of fatigue. The Supreme Court sus-
tained the Court of Appeals' and held that the provision would not be
taken literally, allowing the insured to recover benefits for total and
permanent disability.'
The use of the disability clause in life insurance is comparatively
new; the regular life companies did not adopt it generally until I907.3
The clause was added for a nominal cost and became a very good selling
point. However, its legal interpretation has caused a great deal of diffi-
culty and has been one of the major problems of life insurance compan-
ies.4 Unlike death, which is one of the most unequivocal of insured
events, or even fire which has only occasionally given rise to litigation,
total and permanent disability is not unambiguous and is capable of sev-
eral interpretations. If strictly interpreted it would seem to deny benefits
to all except the absolutely helpless.5 Such an interpretation would
2' PATTERSON, ESSENTIAL OF INS. LAW (1935), p. 122-Patterson weighs the necessity
for the doctrine of subrogation.
' Gibbons v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 6z Ohio App. 280, 15 Ohio Op. 594,
23 N.E. (2d) 66z (938).
' Gibbons v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 135 Ohio St. 481, 2i N.E. (zd) 58S
('939).
'First policies (life) containing this clause appeared in Germany in 1876 and in
American Fraternal Orders in the following year. It appeared in regular life companies in
United States in 1896 but not generally till 1907 and thereafter. HUNTER, TOTAL AND
PERMANENT DISABILITY 1ENEFITS IN RELATION TO LIFE INSURANCE (19O) p. I.
Mutual Life Insurance Co. in 1896 was the first life company in United States to
adopt it. GEPIART, INSURANCE (1917) Vol. I, p. 174.
" Insurance company will also face other hazards. Insured may pretend to be more
seriously incapacitated than he really is and the prospect of a long rest at the expense of
the company may psychologically retard his recovery. Insured's mental attitude may pro-
long the insured event and continue physical disability. Insured's income also has a bearing
on these risks, if the amounts payable are comparable to or more than his earnings.
Ohio National Life Insurance Co. v. Stagner, 23! Ky. 275, 21 S.W. (zd) 289;
Prudential Insrance Co. v. South, 179 Ga. 653, 177 S.E. 499 (1934).
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greatly decrease the desirability of the clause in the eyes of the pro-
spective policy holders and even insurance companies have admitted that
so extreme an interpretation was never intended.' But, if the most
extreme interpretation is to be rejected and a somewhat more liberal
approach authorized, we are left without definite guides as to how
broad an interpretation may be given the clause, and it is not surprising
that courts have differed in their construction of the wording.
Similar clauses have long been common in accident policies but courts
have made no distinction between them and life policies, either failing
to recognize the possibility of a different construction or holding that
since the life policies are framed and sold with provisions covering the
field usually occupied by accident insurance, like terms need impose like
obligations.' A basis for a distinction would lie in the fact that most
accident policies are cancellable at the end of a year while a life policy
would be non-cancellable' and the companies' risk would increase with
the age of the insured. ' Likewise, the original purpose of the clause was
to guarantee to the insured, in case he became disabled, the continuance
of his life policy and some income to relieve his minor needs, but the
courts have held that such a contract of insurance is not one of indemnity
against loss of income but rather against loss of capacity to work." Of
all the types of insurance policies, accident insurance has been most
strictly construed against the insurer and the liberal construction which
is given to most of the accident clauses has tended to support a similar
construction wherever found.
Most of the disability clauses are of two types: first, those providing
that the insured must be disabled from engaging in his own occupation
or business, and second, those providing that the party must be disabled
from engaging in any occupation or pursuing any business for wages or
profit. The first clause has not given so much difficulty and some courts
have left it to the jury to decide." Most courts hold that this clause does
not mean absolute physical inability to transact any kind of business re-
lating to the insured's occupation but rather inability to perform the sub-
"See brief of coun el for insurance company in the principal case, p. 486, (see foot-
note z, supra).
'Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. BlUe, zzz Ala. 665, 133 So. 707 (1931); 6
COOLEY'S BRIEsS ON INsURANCE (2d ed., 19 zS) p. 5536i 79 A.L.R. 858.
' Non-cancellable disability income insurance is designed to protect against the "living
death," the wvorst of the three forms of death to the self-supporting individual, the other
two being the "actual death" and the "retirement death." HUENER, INsURANCE (1935)
p. 421.
' GEPHART, op. cit.,n. 3, P. 174.
"'Backman %,. Trauel-'s Insurance Company, 78 N.H. 500, 97 Atl. 223 (5956);
Suttles v. Railway Mail Association, I56 App. Div. 435, 541 N.Y. Supp. 5o24 ( 913).
Lobdill v. Laboring Mutual Aid Association, 69 Minn. 14, 71 N.W. 696 (1897)i
Amcrican Liability Co. v. Bow man, 6S Ind. App. 107, 114 N.E. 99z (917).
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stantial acts connected with his occupation.12 Performance of single or
trivial acts or even acts he had been accustomed to do before would not
preclude recovery.' 3 The fact that the insured might receive some profit
in a business owned by him or a gift in wages has been held not to bar
a recovery, at least where he does not substantially carry on the business
or occupation. 4 Some courts have held that it would be enough if the
injury were such that common care or prudence require him to desist
from his labors and rest, so long as this was reasonably necessary to
effectuate a cure.' 5
The second type of clause is the more common and is the one found
in the principal case. Its construction has given the courts more diffi-
culty. On one hand, some courts, including North Carolina, Pennsyl-
vania, and Tennessee, have given the clause a fairly literal interpretation
and have held that it is plain and unambiguous and needs no construc-
tion."8 They would say that the insured is not totally disabled if he can
carry on any real work, though not necessarily of the same nature or type
he was previously engaged in." The Iowa court in a series of recent
cases has continued to follow the doctrine although admitting that it
cannot be reconciled with most of the cases in the country.'"
The weight of authority, then, supports a more liberal view. Many
courts argue that a clause which provides that an insured is disabled if
he is unable to perform any work should be construed to mean any work
for which he may be fitted by his experience, education, age, or natural
ability.' 9 They would say that although the insured might perform
some work or engage in some profession for which he is not fitted, such
possibility would not preclude a recovery.2" Along this line it has been
'National Life and Accident Insurance Co. v. Bradley, 245 Ky. 311, 53 S.W. (2d)
70 (1932); Jacobs v. Loyal Protective Insurance Co., 97 Vt. S16, 124. Ad. 848 (1924);
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Philer, 16o Ark. 98, 254 S?-V. 335 (1923).
'Boswnorth v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 114 W.Va. 663, 173 S.E. 780 (1934);
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Kelsay, 257 Ky. 263, 78 S.W. (2d) 923 (5935).
'
4 Medlinsky v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 146 Misc. 855, 263 N.Y.Supp. x79
(933)-
"Young v. Traveler's Insurance Co., 8o Me. 224, 13 AtI. 896 (i888); Hayes v.
North American Life and Casualty Co., 155 Minn. 124, 186 N.W. 536 (1932).
'o Thigpen v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., 204. N.C. 551, 168 S.E. 845
(1933); Cooper v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 317 Pa. 405, 177 At. 43 (1935); Pruden-
tial Insurance Co. v. Davis, 18 Tenn. App. 453, 78 S.W. (zd) 358 (5934).
'
7
Lee v. New York Life Insurance Co., x88 N.C. 538, 125 S.E. x86 (1924); Buck-
man v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., 172 N.C. 762, 90 S.E. 897 (5956).
" See Hurley v. Banke's Life Co., 598 Iowa 5529, 599 N.W. 343 (5924); Corsaut
v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 203 Iowa 74., 211 N.W. 222, 5 A.L.R. I035
(5927); Kurth v. Continental Life Insurance Co., 255 Iowa 737, 234 NAV. 2o (5931)i
Garden v. New England Mutual Life Insurance Co., 254 N.W. 287 (1934).
" Wall v. Continental Casualty Co., iii Mo. App. 504, 86 SV.W 491 (igoS); Aetna
Life Insurance Co. v. Person, 188 Ark. 864, 67 $.W. (zd) 5007; Katz v. Union Central
Life Insurance Co., =z6 Mo. App. 618, 44 S.W. (2d) 5250 (1932).
' Arico v. Prudential Insurance Co., 241 App. Div. 8z6, 271 N.Y. Supp. 241 (1934.);
Ursaner v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 546 Misc. 5z, z62 N.Y. Supp. 462 (1933).
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held that a knee injury to a day laborer which prevented his performance
of any manual labor was a total disability, although it would not of
course prevent a man from engaging in a business or profession.2' Like-
wise a physician was considered totally disabled from performing any
work when a mental infirmity causing forgetfulness made it impossible
to continue in his profession.22
Other courts follow an even more liberal rule and grant indemnity
when the insured is prevented from following his usual vocation although
the language does not thus restrict the disability to be indemnified."
They hold that the language is so broad that a literal interpretation
would be absurd and come to the conclusion that the insurer must mean
the vocation or calling the insured was engaged in at the time he became
disabled. 4 It is not unusual for the courts to announce that they are
crediting the insurance company with the highest motives and thus
rationalize an interpretation that is not apparent from the language
itself.2"
The word "permanent" in the phase "total and permanent disa-
bility" has also been construed by the courts, but has caused them less
difficulty. If used in its strict lexigraphical meaning, it stands for infinite
duration and in this respect could never be determined until the
death of the insured."6 However, the word is a relative one and its sig-
nificance depends upon the subject matter in connection with which it
is employed.2 " It may be said, for example, that a person has a perma-
nent position but this does not necessarily mean for life. The problem has
been, for the most part, settled by the companies themselves, by a provi-
sion in the policy specifying a certain period of time after which the
disability will be presumed to be permanent. In addition, they may make
annual proof of continued disability a condition precedent to the recovery
of benefits,"8 and such a provision, as the court in the instant case points
out, is scarcely consistent with the most literal meaning of the word
"permanent."
'- Industrial Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Hawkins, 94 Ark. 417, 127 S.W. 457 (191o).
' Missouri State Life Insurance Co. v. Case, i89 Ark. 223, 71 SAV. (zd) 299; see
alo Aetna Life Insurance v. Person (cited supra footnote 29).
' Gordon v. United States Casualty Co., (Tenn. Ch.) S4 SAV. 98 (1899); Niel v.
United Friends, 78 Hun. Z55, z8, N.Y. Supp. 928 (1894); Mutuat Benefit Association v.
Alancarrow, (Colo. App.) 71 Pac. 423 (1903); Prundential Insurance Co. v. Harris, z54
Ky. 23, 70 S.W. (2d) 949 (1934)-
" Foglesong v. Modern Brotherhood, 2z Mo. App. 548, 97 S.W. z40 (29o6); Davis
v. Midland Casualty Co., x9o Ill. App. 338 (1914-).
' United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. McCarthy, (C.C.A. 8th) So F. (zd) 2(1931).
"40 A.L.R. 1386; HUEBNER, INSU33ANCE (i935) p. 422.
'
2Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Milton, z6o Ga. 168, 1z7 S.E. 240 (19zs).
" ".. . insured shall at any time, but not oftener than once a year, on demand of the
company, furnish due proof of the continuance of such disability and permit examination
by a medical examiner of the company. .. ."
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Courts following the liberal interpretation do not penalize the in-
sured because he attempts to perform some sort of work. They hold that
he is rendered wholly unable to engage in any occupation or perform
any work for compensation if his condition is such that he is unable to
work without running the risk of increasing his disability or shortening
his life.29 Generally, attempts to do work will not preclude recovery
even though the insured succeeded in doing some work.3" This result
seems fair; if held otherwise the insured would tend to refrain from any
attempts to work and thus protect his possibility for a recovery. 3
The liberal attitude of the courts in construing these clauses and the
adverse experience 31 of the companies, particularly in the early stages of
the depression, led to a general revision and restriction of the disability
clause in 1932. One group of companies issuing about sixty per cent of
the country's new insurance, decided to discontinue the disability income
provision and retain only the waiver of premium provision. The rest of
the companies increased the monthly waiting period to six months and
reduced the monthly income from one per cent of the face of the policy
to one-half per cent and the age limit was reduced to fifty-five.33 But
these changes have no effect on life policies which had been written
prior to 1932 and the life companies may expect a continued loss on the
old disability provisions under the liberal interpretation given by most
courts. Accident companies with their annual policies could very well
meet the need for disability protection and cope with the problem of
regulating rates to conform with their experience in payment of benefits.
The clause has been involved in several other Ohio cases but in only
one did the decision turn upon the meaning of the disability phrase. In
Mosher v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States,"4 the
court held in favor of the insurer, relying largely on Hurley v. Banker's
Life Co."5 The principal case has clearly adopted the broader construc-
tion. In addition to declaring that the terms must be liberally construed,
it specifically holds that an insured is totally and permanently disabled if
' Rezenda v. Prudential Insurance Co., z85 Mass. 5S, r 89 N.E. 826 (1934) ; Clark-
son v. New York Life Insurance Co., (1933, D.C.) 4 F. Supp. 791; Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Dowdle, x89 Ark. 296, 71 S.W. (2d) 691 (5934).
'Booth v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., (N.J.L.) 23o Ad. 131 (1925);
Kramer v. Traveler's Insurance Co., iir Pa. Super. 367, 17o Atl. 700 (1934).
"' Monahan v. Supreme Lodge of the Order of Columbian Knights, 88 Minn. 224, 92
N.W. 972 (2903).
" Concept of disability is inadequate to furnish criterion in gathering statistical data.
PATTERSON, INSURANCE (ist ed. 1935) p. 209.
Latest definition of disability in terms of reduction in the insured's income might
eliminate the intangible factors but Massachusetts refused permission to use it. See Mutual
Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Commissioners, 271 Mass. 365, 171 N.E. 656 (930).
"3 HUEBNER, LIFE INSUBANCE (1935) p. 433.
57 Ohio App. 435, 14 N.E. (zd) 413 (1936)
: Note s 8, iaupra.
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because of the ulcer he is unable to pursue his regular vocation or em-
ployment. Ohio is thus placed definitely in the majority liberal group.
In fact, the specific nature of the test would indicate that its position in
the group is well toward the front. H. D. R.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS - EFFECT OF HIGHER INTEREST
RATE AFTER MATURITY - CONTRACT FOR LIQUIDATED
DAMAGES OR PENALTY - EFFECT UPON
NEGOTIABILITY
The defendants executed a promissory note to a bank, for which
the plaintiff was receiver, for $7000 due in one year, with interest at six
per cent per annum. In addition, it contained a provision that the note
should draw interest at eight per cent per annum after maturity to be
computed and paid semi-annually until the principal and accrued interest
were paid. In a suit on the note to recover eight per cent, the Court of
Appeals held that where money is paid by the borrower to the lender for
the use of money after it is past due it is regarded as liquidated damages,
and that the parties may stipulate in the lending contract for a rate of
interest after maturity higher than the rate before, but it must not exceed
the maximum rate prescribed by the usuary statute.'
This exact situation seems to be a case of first impression in Ohio.
However, there are two earlier cases somewhat related which furnish
an interesting comparison. In addition, a question arises as to the court's
interpretation of sec. 8303 Ohio G.C., that is, does this section expressly
authorize a stipulation for a higher interest rate after maturity than
before?
"In Ohio, the agreement is legal, expressly made so by statute (sec.
8303 G.C.)"' With those words, the court in the principal case accepts
'Hackett v. Kripke et al, 6z Ohio App. 89, 23 N.E. (2d) 438 (1939). In the princi-
psI ca e the provision in the note that it was to be eight per cent per annum "payable
, tmi-annually" v. a not discussed. A question arises as to whether or not this is usurious
indcr Siction S303 which provides that the interest must "not exceed eight per cent per
annum, payable annually." In Cook v. Courtright, 40 Ohio St. 248 (1883), the court held
that a tipulation that the interest was to be eight per cent per annum payable semi-annually
v~aq not uurious under Section 8,303. The court held that a contract to pay eight per cent
per annum on a given principal payable semi-annually, the interest to be paid on that prin-
cipal, is the same thing as eight per cent per annum payable annually upon the same prin-
cipal. However, under the same statute, if the interest is at eight per cent per annum pay-
able annually in advance, it is usurious. Thus, if a note is for $I2,OOO at eight per cent
per annum payable in advance and if the interest is deducted from the principal before
giving it to the borrower, the borrower pays eight and sixty-eight one hundredths per cent
on the amount actually received for his use. Insurasce Co. v. Carpenter, 40 Ohio St. 26o
(IS8 3 ). It is interesting to note that these two cases were decided during the same term.
S6ura note 5.
